Illicit Cohabitation of Parties as Affecting Contracts Made Between Them - Baxter v. Wilburn by unknown
Maryland Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 3 Article 8
Illicit Cohabitation of Parties as Affecting Contracts
Made Between Them - Baxter v. Wilburn
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Illicit Cohabitation of Parties as Affecting Contracts Made Between Them - Baxter v. Wilburn, 2 Md. L. Rev. 291 (1938)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol2/iss3/8
BAXTER v. WILBURN
ing the duty to respond in damages to the person best cal-
culated to be capable to bear that burden-the owner of the
car-and upon the idea that providing a car for another's
use is, in substance, if not in common law, the proximate
cause of the accident.
A sixth source is accidental, rather than legal. Fre-
quently policies of automobile liability insurance are so
written as to protect others than the insured, if driving his
car with his permission. To the extent which injured par-
sons can force the insurance companies to pay them under
such policies, written as guarantees against liability, they
provide avenues for collecting from the insured parent or
insured car owner, as the case may be.




Plaintiff-appellant brought a bill in equity against his
former mistress to enforce a mortgage against certain resi-
dential property he had bought for her and had caused to be
conveyed to her alone. The mortgage, executed to him by
her at the time of the purchase, was left in her custody, and
was orally agreed to be recorded and have effect only in the
event that she predeceased him. This plan, if successful,
was calculated not only to deprive plaintiff's wife of any
rights in the property, but also to secure to him a return of
his investment in the eventuality of the prior death of the
grantee. The parties became estranged, and plaintiff sought
to establish and foreclose his lien at once. Plaintiff's bill
did not connect the mortgage with the illicit cohabitation of
the parties, but he did testify that he would not have put up
any money for the property if he had not thought that the
woman would associate with -him as man and wife, and that
the mortgage was to have no effect "provided we lived to-
gether and everything was all right." The lower court dis-
missed the bill, holding the entire transaction to be per-
meated by the illicit relationship of the parties and there-
fore not compatible with equitable relief. On appeal, Held:
Affirmed. Contracts promoting illicit cohabitation are void
and unenforceable in equity. Although the factor of im-
moral sexual relations would not itself necessarily invali-
1190 AtI. 773 (Md. 1937).
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date all contracts made between persons engaged therein, it
would have that effect when said contracts were made in
pursuance thereof. Here, the meretricious behaviour of the
parties gave color to the mortgage transaction and was so
closely interrelated with it as to preclude equitable inter-
ference.
This case poses a problem not exactly novel in the field
of the law, but one which is nevertheless provocative of
thought and interest, namely, to what extent will illicit inter-
course between persons affect the legal validity of transac-
tions made by them with each other.
In order the better to understand the decisions upon the
point, it would seem advisable to present a verbal classifica-
tion of matters closely related to the instant problem; other-
wise, the terminology used is apt to be confusing. Most of
the difficulty centers around that somewhat ambiguous term
"illegal". It has been suggested that said expression be.
trisected into certain broad groups,2 namely:
1. Transactions prohibited by statute.
2. Transactions against public policy.
3. Transactions contrary to good morals."
The problem of illicit cohabitation may be classified as a
sub-division of group three. This latter group, designating
things "contra bonos mores," has included also in its cate-
gory the problems of gambling contracts and agreements for
the suppression of prosecution. For the most part, where
the law is expressed as relating to illegal transactions, the
principles enunciated will be applicable to the above-men-
tioned cognate divisions; and when the broad primary term
is used in this note, it is expressly employed with this
thought in mind.
As a general rule, illegal -contracts are deemed void, no
relief being given upon them at law or in equity.' How-
ever, contracts arising from illicit cohabitation' may not be
' See Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts (3rd Ed.), See. 281.
' It is obvious that this analysis is not wholly satisfactory by reason of
the manifest interrelation of the group headings. For example, an act pro-
hibited by statute may possibly, in the ordinary sense of the terms be
against public policy and at the same time be contrary to good morals, etc.
The term, public policy, itself, is so broad as to mean almost everything or
nothing at all. However, these distinctions made are largely artificial and
technical, and serve only as convenient divisions of the still more compre-
hensive term, illegal transaction.
' See 12 American Jurisprudence 713-717. 13 C. 3. 492. Also, Pomeroy,
Specific Performance of Contracts (3rd Ed.), Sec. 280.
'It would seem that the condemnation of the courts falls not only upon
illicit cohabitation that is adulterous in nature, but also upon any
meretricious sexual conduct.
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enforced in equity not only because they are considered void
as against the best interests of public welfare, but also be-
cause they may involve that doctrine peculiarly associated
with equity, namely, that he who comes into equity must
come with clean hands.' This latter maxim, founded upon
the premise that equity is a court of conscience and good
morals, is universally applied in that tribunal. It is exer-
cised not only when the subject matter of the litigation is
illegal or void at law, but also where the party seeking relief
has been guilty of such misconduct in reference to the par-
ticular action that he cannot with propriety and decency
ask for aid before such an honorable forum.
What particular kind of misconduct will justify the
Court of equity in refusing assistance depends largely upon
the facts of the individual case and the judicial discretion
of the Court. In many cases in equity involving illicit co-
habitation as an operative factor, it would not be necessary
for the Court to rely upon the clean hands doctrine. The
invalidity of transactions arising from such conduct as rec-
ognized by courts of law in general would ordinarily be a
sufficient bar, but it is not difficult to imagine that cases of
such a nature might emerge where the unclean hands rule,
because of its larger scope, might serve to exclude equitable
relief, although upon the same facts, the general rules of
law would not preclude a remedy.
The legal effect of contracts connected with illicit co-
habitation, and of illegal contracts in general, is such that
the courts will ordinarily leave the parties as they find them,
neither enforcing executory transactions nor setting aside
those which have been completed. This seemingly negative
action by the courts is supposed to exert an affirmative in-
fluence upon the public. It is thought that judicial non-in-
terference in such instances will tend to discourage the un-
dertaking or continuance of such unsocial behaviour.TA short review of several Maryland cases will serve to
show that these principles have been followed to an appre-
ciable extent in this state. In Gotwalt v. Neal,8 involving
a bill in equity to set aside certain deeds of property exe-
cuted to compound a threatened prosecution, the court, in
refusing relief, said:
"The law is well settled that contracts made in vio-
lation of law9 cannot be enforced. When, however,
* See Roman v. Mali, 42 Md. 513 (1875). Also, 21 C. J. 192.
'6 R. C. L. 816.8 25 Md. 434 (1866).
* I. e., those transactions contrary to statute, public policy, and good
morals.
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such contracts have been executed by payment of money
thereon, or the conveyance and delivery of property,
the rule, which seems to be best established both by the
weight of authority and reason, is to refuse to grant
relief and leave the parties where they have placed
themselves." 1 I
In Lester v. The Howard Bank,11 concerning the en-
forcement in equity of a contract made in violation of a
statute, the court stated:
"Public policy . . . lies at the basis of the law in
regard to illegal contracts, and the rule is adopted not
for the benefit of the parties, but for the public."12
There are certain important exceptions to the general
rule of non-enforceability of illegal contracts, including
those arising ex turpi causa,15 Plaintiff in the principal
case relied upon two of these:
1. Where the parties are not in pari delicto.
2. Where the transaction is separate from the illegal
or immoral aspects of the case.
The first exception is found where the parties to an other-
wise illegal agreement are not equally at fault in the eyes of
the law, by reason of-factors of fraud, duress or undue in-
fluence. In such cases, if the interests of public welfare
would be better served by granting relief to the one com-
paratively more innocent, he may be given aid.14  This dis-
tinction was recognized in Maryland in Roman v. Mali,"
where it was held that:
"There may be different degrees of guilt as between
the parties to the fraudulent or illegal transaction; and
if one party act under circumstances of oppression, im-
position, undue influence, or at a great disadvantage
with the other party concerned, so that it appears that
his guilt is subordinate to that of the defendant, the
court, in such case, will relieve."
10 Accord: Brown v. Reilly, 72 Md. 489, 20 At. 239 (1890) ; Baxter v.
Deneen, 98 Md. 181, 57 AtI. 601 (1904) ; Snyder v. Snyder, 51 Md. 80 (1879) ;
Baker v. Couch, 74 Colo. 380, 221 Pac. 108 (1924) ; Benson v. Georgian Co.,
21 Ga. App. 448, 94 S. E. 644 (1917).1133 Md. 558 (1871).
12 See in this connection, McConnon v. Holden, 35 Idaho 75, 204 Pac. 656
(1922).
1- "Ex turpi causa non oritur actio", I. e., No action arises from an Im-
moral consideration.14 See Berman v. Coohley, 243 Mass. 348, 137 N. E. 667 (1923). Also,
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 2, Sec. 941; 12 American Jurispru-
dence, 734-735; 13 C. J. 498.1042 Md. 513 (1875).
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An example of this judicial leniency may be found in
those decisions allowing the recovery of an usurious rate of
interest by the borrower whose distress through lack of
money presumably puts him at a disadvantage with the
lender. 6 It is thought that such unlawful conduct will more
likely be discouraged if relief be given in such instances,
aside from the fact of the individual equity of the borrower
derived from his fnancial embarrassment. Somewhat the
same policy lies behind those statutes in several jurisdic-
tions which allow the recovery of satisfied gambling debts.17
Some courts, in considering the question of equal fault
between the parties, have declined to apply the exception
where the transaction involves moral turpitude.18 In those
jurisdictions, the defense or extenuation would not be open
where the contract sought to be enforced arose from illicit
cohabitation of the parties. In the principal case, no men-
tion was made of this distinction ;19 for the court found that
both parties were equally guilty in the moral misconduct,
and there was no necessity to make any discrimination. In
this connection it is interesting to note the New York case
of Vincent v. Moriarity,° where the Court of equity, in re-
fusing to enfarce a contract connected with illicit cohabita-
tion, intimated that where a woman had been deceived and
betrayed into an illicit union, the Court might be more apt
to find a way of giving relief in order to avoid an injustice.
The second exception to the general rule which Plaintiff
in the instant case contended for is well recognized but not
always easy of application. It is stated that where the
agreement sought to be enforced is only remotely connected
with an illegal or immoral transaction, and rests upon an
independent and valid consideration, and plaintiff can prove
his case without basing it upon such illegality, it will be
upheld.21 This exception is not inconsistent with the clean
hands doctrine in equity, for that maxim is confined, as al-
16 See Gotw. t v. Neal, 25 Md. 434, 448 (1866).
17 See Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 254.
Tracy v. Talmage, 14 N. Y. 162, 67 Am. Dec. 132 (1856).
l' In connection with the problem of unenforceabillty of illegal contracts,
some jurisdictions seem to draw a distinction between contracts malum in se
(those immoral or wrong in themselves) and contracts involving mala
prohibita (things prohibited by statutory law), no action lying to enforce
the former agreements. Maryland recognized this distinction in Lester v.
Howard Bank, 33 Md. 558 (1871). The more modern view seems to reject
this discrimination, and holds that the force and effect to be given to
illegal contracts, regardless of their origin or the differential fault of the
parties, should be determined solely by their functional nature and their
relation to the interests of public welfare. See Williston, Contracts, VoL 3,
Sec. 1764.0 52 N. T. S. 519, 31 App. Dlv. 484 (1898).
S See Williston, Contracts, Vol. 8, Sec. 1752.
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ready noted, to misconduct connected with the transaction
in litigation only. One who has been guilty of the greatest
depravity may come into the Court of equity so long as his
cause, itself, is not tainted therewith.22  Applying this prin-
ciple to the illicit cohabitation of the parties in the instant
case, the court stated that the mere fact that persons were
maintaining an illicit sexual relationship would not prevent
them from making enforceable agreements with each other
where said agreements could be supported independently
of their unlawful relation. Plaintiff in the principal case
tried to come within this exception by contending that even
if the conveyance of the property was done for an immoral
consideration, yet the mortgage transaction was separate
therefrom and was valid notwithstanding the other agree-
ment. The court was of a different opinion, however, and
in refusing to separate the two transactions, held, first, that
the conveyance of the house was not a gift disconnected
from the illicit relations of the parties, but a provision for
the habitation of it, and second, that the mortgage was in-
separably tied up with the whole arrangement. The court
took cognizance of the fact that Plaintiff was not seeking
the enforcement of the actually expressed agreement of the
parties, which referred only to the effect of the mortgage
as conditioned by the prior death of defendant, but that
Plaintiff was attempting to give the lien a present effect.
The court thought this to be ample evidence of an attempt
to use the mortgage as a remedy for the failure of the con-
tinuation of the immoral arrangement, and that Plaintiff
was endeavoring to use the lien to escape the results of an
unprofitable bargain.3 In his testimony, Plaintiff signifi-
cantly stated "Of course she could not kick me out, and
then try to take the home away from me."
There are fairly numerous decisions of courts outside
Maryland where a distinction is drawn between agreements
directly connected with illicit cohabitation and those only
22 See A. L. R. 65 for a good discussion and annotation upon the doctrine
of unclean hands in equity. See also, Equitable Gaslight Co. v. Baltimore
Coal Tar & Mfg. Co., 65 Md. 84, 3 At. 108 (1880), holding: "The maxim
that he who comes into a court of equity must come with clean hands, is
confined to his conduct in the matter before the Court, and not to matters
aliunde."
"* The court refused to comment to any extent upon a possible source of
relief to plaintiff through a cancellation of the whole arrangement, but it
is submitted that no relief would be available by this means. Some juris-
dictions allow a cancellation of certain types of illegal agreements where
they are entirely executory. Here, the immoral arrangement was not only
partly executed, but the element of moral turpitude involved would no
doubt preclude equitable relief to the same extent as shown in the principal
case.
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remotely associated therewith. In several cases arising
from a claim for housekeeper services where the parties
were living in a state of concubinage, the courts enforced
the claim if it was supported by an express agreement, and
if the services were not rendered in contemplation of the
illicit relationship. 4 However, under the same circum-
stances, where there was a claim for such services based
upon an implied contract only, some courts refused relief
because of the presumption of an illegal inducement to the
transaction.2 5
It is worthwhile to observe that the cases involving the
subject matter of this note seem to make a distinction be-
tween contracts supported by a consideration of past un-
lawful cohabitation, and those etipulating for future illicit
intercourse. Where the transaction is based entirely upon
past cohabitation, and there is no intent to continue it in the
future, the courts are disinclined to bar relief because of the
immoral aspects of the case, although the agreement itself
may not be enforceable for another distinct reason, namely,
insufficient consideration because of past performance."
The rationale of this discrimination is that the law ought
not to bar a person, on moral grounds, from compensating
for what may have been an injustice done to the other party.
Where it is a question of the commencement or continuation
of future illicit cohabitation, the cases are unanimous in
applying the general rule of non-enforceability. It is not
certain whether the Maryland courts would follow the above
distinction. In the principal case, the precise point was not
directly involved, for an intended continuation of the unlaw-
ful cohabitation was shown; but the court quoted from a
prominent authority"T in the field of equity jurisprudence
to the effect that "contracts based upon the consideration
either past or future, of illicit sexual intercourse" were void
and unenforceable in equity. This same authority inti-
mated that equity differed from law in this respect, prob-
ably because of equity's emphasis upon the clean hands of
parties coming into its courts.
In conclusion it would seem fitting to call attention once
again to the underlying principle of the non-enforceability
of illegal contracts in general, and those connected with
"Cf. Stewart v. Waterman, 97 Vt. 408, 123 Atl. 524 (1924) ; Emerson v.
Botkin, 26 Oki. 218, 109 Pac. 531 (1910). The above cases were actions at
law, but the general principles for which they are cited would no doubt be
applicable in equity.
5 Cf. Ann. Cas. 1916 B 114; also, 28 R. C. L. 679.
2" Cf. 17 A. L. R. 1311; 12 American Jurisprudence 675.
Ov Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 9386.
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illicit cohabitation in particular, namely, public policy. At
first glance, this negative behaviour of the courts faced by
the problem of an illegal contract might appear somewhat
unjust in aiding one malfeasor by allowing him to set up
his own wrongdoing as a defense in a suit against him by
his opponent, who has the misfortune to be on the wrong
side of the legal fence, perhaps purposely placed there by
his adversary. It is true, however, that the unintended as-
sistance given by the courts to one party in such cases is
only an incidental result of the maintenance of a more ulti-
mate policy, and this is a sufficient excuse for such left-
handed aid if said policy is sound in theory and practice.
Through its application it is claimed that the individual
equities, or rather inequities, of the parties are subordinated
to the more important considerations of public welfare in
general. It is contended that, by refusing any affirmative
judicial relief, and by putting the parties upon their own
honor, as it were, there will be less of an incentive to engage
in such socially reprehensible conduct. It is suspected that
there is no honor among thieves and other moral aberrants;
therefore, the mutual suspicion of the miscreants should
make them very cautious before leaping into what may be a
hopeless position, presuming, of course, that they have
knowledge of the fact that the courts will not help them out
of any embarrassment. The only alternative course for the
law to take upon such a problem, outside of some scheme of
forfeiture involving both parties, would seem to be a
restoration of the status quo where possible. Such action
,would hardly tend to discourage illegal transactions be-
tween parties. As the law now stands, unfortunately, it
furnishes a good opportunity for an especially unscrupu-
lous person with a superior knowledge of legal principles
to gain a decided advantage; however, the exceptions to the
general rule ordinarily furnish the courts with sufficient
discretion to protect the interests of public welfare, and at
the same time to forestall the perpetration of any gross in-
dividual injustice.
